We explore the impact of campaign effort on constituency-level turnout variation in Britain, under the premise that higher levels of campaign visibility stimulate electoral participation. We focus on the relationship between the competitiveness of the race and campaign effort as a provider of electoral information on the one hand, and voter turnout on the other hand. In doing so, we address the role of campaign effort and competitiveness in shaping turnout both independently as well as jointly. Further to this, we seek to add nuance to our understanding of how electoral campaigns mobilise voters by evaluating the comparative ability of different parties -based on whether or not they are 'viable' contenders in a particular constituency -to stimulate turnout. We find evidence that campaign effort mobilises voters and has a significant positive effect on voter turnout; this effect is independent from, and unconditioned by, the competitiveness of the race. However, we do find that this effect is mostly driven by the campaign effort of the 'viable' contenders in the constituency.
Introduction
For much of the early post-war period in Britain, local electoral campaigns were often dismissed as being largely ineffective in terms of shaping electoral outcomes. Over the last three decades, however, extensive research has challenged and successfully shifted this consensus. As a result, there is now very little room for doubt left: local campaigns matter. Efforts put in place by candidates and parties in the run up to the polling day clearly have an impact upon voters' choices. Next to that, campaign effort has also a discernible positive effect on turnout (Geys 2006) . The more intense, visible, and informative an electoral campaign is, the higher the likelihood of citizens casting a vote.
While a myriad of other factors also contribute to explaining turnout and electoral results, the positive effects of local campaign effort on both of these phenomena are rather uncontested.
Campaign effort is the combination of activities aimed at maximising electoral gains.
It serves the purpose of mobilising the electorate: from the core supporter to the electorally undecided voter. It does so by enhancing the wider salience of the election as well as promoting the specific partisan message. In fact, campaign efforts put in place by political parties and candidates, together with intensive media coverage, are the two key sources of information available to voters in the run up to the election.
Here, we focus on the former; specifically, we explore the impact of campaign effort on constituency-level turnout variation under the premise that more visible campaigns encourage electoral participation. Experimental studies have shown that citizens are more likely to vote when they are stimulated by exposure to campaign information (Green and Gerber 2008) . In a similar vein, observational studies have shown that campaign mobilisation effort is a very powerful predictor of turnout not just in the US (Hillygus 2005) , but across various electoral institutions (Karp and Banducci 2007; Karp et al. 2008 ).
We explore the extent to which local-level campaign effort actually affects turnout in the context of the 2010 British general election. Our analysis focuses on campaigning during the short campaign; i.e., from the dissolution of the Parliament to the polling day. We then turn to uncover whether the effects of campaign effort are moderated by the competitiveness of the race. While this is not an uncharted territory, little attention has to date been paid to the potential interaction between the competitiveness of a constituency race and campaign effort put in place by parties in the constituency. We add nuance and provide a more complete account of these effects by including the socalled minor parties, which are often neglected, also to our analysis. While they often struggle to secure large numbers of MPs under the first-past-the-post system, they represent an undeniably substantial electoral presence in British politics. Parties like the UK Independence Party and the Green Party are not just fielding increasing number of candidates at general elections, but they are also enjoying growing vote shares.
Moreover, regional parties like the Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru are expanding their presence beyond the devolved institutions. There are more and more constituencies at Westminster elections where electorally relevant information is coming also from parties other than the Labour Party, the Conservative Party, and the Liberal Democrats. As such, their effects should be taken into consideration. Our aim, therefore, is to take into account that the 'traditional' main parties are no longer the only salient providers of electoral information for voters in today's British political landscape.
We find strong evidence that both the aggregate constituency-level campaign effort put in place by all local candidates and the marginality of the seat affect turnout -i.e., the proportion of people choosing to cast their ballot is notably higher in marginal constituencies as well as in constituencies where parties spend more on their electoral campaigns. When disentangling this effect, we find, however, that the campaign effort put in place by the 'viable' contenders in the constituency has a far greater impact upon turnout than the effort of 'other' parties. Further to this, and against our theoretical expectations, we find no evidence that the competitiveness of the race conditions the positive effect of campaign effort, neither for the viable contenders in the constituency nor for the others. In other words, the local level effort to get out the vote by parties and candidates is equally important in marginal and safe seats.
The article is organised as follows. We first discuss the developments regarding voter turnout in Britain and survey the existing literature on campaign effort and electoral participation. This is done to draw our theoretical expectations and methodological approach. Then, we outline the rationale for our approach to assessing the effect of aggregate and disaggregate campaign effort on turnout. After this, we describe our data and measures. In the final section, we present and examine the findings, to then conclude with a discussion of their implications.
Constituency-Level Electoral Dynamics
We begin with a discussion of the dependent variable in the study; i.e., constituencylevel turnout.
1 UK-wide turnout at the election to the House of Commons was 65% in 2010, but just like campaign effort, it varied greatly across different constituencies. The electoral system used for general elections in Britain accentuates the role of the local level in relation to both the competitiveness of the race as well as campaign intensity.
One may reasonably assume that the campaign dynamics were different in a constituency like Aberavon -where the difference in the vote share of the winner and the runner up in 2005 was 46% -from those in places such as Ceredigion where the difference was 0.6% and the winner decided by only a handful of votes. In the former, voters may feel that turning out to vote is a rather pointless exercise, while in the latter each extra vote is more likely to be felt as potentially pivotal.
Over the recent decades, the view that national arena is the only meaningful level of competition (Kavanagh 1970 ) has been replaced. The conventional wisdom held that local-level campaigns in Britain, possibly more than in other contexts, were largely unimportant in shaping electoral outcomes. The potential impact of local campaigns was first raised in the 1970s by Denver and Hands (1974) . They explored the role of local campaigns in mobilising the electorate and suggested that campaign spending (which they used as a proxy for campaign effort) might actually have a bigger impact on getting people out to vote than constituency marginality. Nowadays, the field of electoral politics in Britain has firmly focused on the sub-national level, following a considerable amount of research being produced on the effects of local campaigns on both voting behaviour Fisher et al. 2011; Pattie 2006, 2008; Pattie et al. 1995) and turnout patterns (Fisher and Denver 2009; Denver et al. 2004) . From studies of campaign effects on vote choice we know that, at general elections, British political parties have proved their capacity to strategically target campaign efforts and, by and large, to make gains (or contain losses) where needed.
The case of the 2010 general election is of particular interest as the televised leaders debates are considered essential in explaining how it unfolded Stevens et al. 2011) . If the information provided at the national level by the mass media saturates the demand for it, then electoral information produced by local campaign effort should in fact not be a significant predictor of turnout any longer. As such, digging deeper into the determinants of constituency-level turnout contributes to the debate on whether there is a shift towards 'TV elections' (Wring and Ward 2010) or whether the local level still continues to play a crucial role in mobilising electoral participation. A first piece of evidence supporting the latter scenario comes from a recent study by Fisher et al. (2016) . They found that despite moves towards microtargeting voters, campaigning by the three largest parties in Britain increases turnout.
However, this approach excludes the potential role of the so-called 'minor' parties as meaningful providers of electoral information, and also leaves aside the increasingly diverse combinations of parties that are serious contenders in many constituencies up and down Britain. Our contribution breaks from the 'traditional' three party frame and accounts for the role played by relative newcomers on the British electoral scene.
Campaign Effort, Competitiveness and Electoral Participation
When parties and their candidates actively engage with the electorate on the ground by intensifying the amount of activities aimed at winning votes in the run-up to the election, they simultaneously increase the amount of information on the election in general. While pursuing of course a partisan agenda, their campaign effort increases the salience of the election by intensifying the public debate surrounding it, as well as voters' exposure to it. Studies of negative campaigning show that the more intense campaign effort that is put in by parties and candidates (regardless of its content), the higher the likelihood of citizens casting a vote. 2 Moreover, the general increase in late deciders (Hayes and McAllister 1996) suggests that 'late' campaign dynamics are likely to play an important role in determining variation in turnout. Therefore, we limit our analysis to the so-called short campaign, covering the campaign effort that took place in the immediate run up to the polling day.
In addition to the effects associated with campaign effort, the likelihood of casting a ballot should be particularly high when the election is expected to be a close race as the perceived utility of voting is greater in a marginal constituency than a safe one.
Therefore, it is unsurprising that previous studies have found two constituency-level characteristics to be highly influential at determining how many people do choose to vote: marginality, as a measure of how competitive a particular constituency is, and campaign effort (Geys 2006) . With regard to constituency marginality, it is widely accepted that when an election is a close contest, the probability that one vote might determine the outcome goes up. This, in turn, increases the perceived utility of voting and acts as an additional motivation to go to the polls. Matsusaka and Palda (1993) refer to it as the Downsian closeness hypothesis. Voters acknowledge that the benefits of casting their ballot are not just limited to merely fulfilling their sense of civic duty, which voting in very safe seats is arguably restricted to, but that they might have a chance of determining the result as well.
With regard to campaign effort, the more candidates invest in their campaigns in a given constituency, the greater their collective capacity to engage with the electorate and expose potential voters to electorally relevant information. As voters are exposed to more electioneering -defined by Bowler and Farrell (2011: 683) as the kinds of activities that get people out to vote -in their daily lives, the amount of information they have on candidates and their policy-positions is naturally increased as a result.
Consequently, voters in constituencies with more intense campaign activity have to bear lower costs of information acquisition (Dawson and Zinser 1976; Chapman and Palda 1983) , in turn, increasing their probability of casting a vote. We build on these two elements by exploring both their separate and joint effects.
Combined and Separate Effort
While studies addressing the effects of campaigning and competitiveness on electoral participation are not in short supply, our approach significantly departs from previous research in response to long-term changes in the British political landscape. Despite the high level of disproportionality that is typical of the first-past-the-post electoral system, Meirionnydd with a 22% majority. Therefore, the campaign efforts put in place by the so-called minor and regional parties are no longer negligible when studying activities that stimulate turnout. Yet, the scholarly tradition on the matter tends to focus merely on the activities of the three (traditionally) largest parties: Labour, Conservatives, and Liberal Democrats (Denver and Hands 1997; Denver et al. 2004; Fieldhouse and Cutts 2009; Fisher 1999; Fisher et al. 2014) . Given the changing landscape of who is and who is not a relevant actor in the context of British elections, limiting the analysis to the campaign efforts put in place by Labour, Conservatives, and Liberal Democrats may omit potentially crucial information needed to explain the effects of campaign effort on turnout.
As such, we depart from the traditional approach by exploring the effects of campaign effort put in place by all parties that are contesting a constituency. In doing so, we explore whether the aggregate effort of all parties in play is responsible for variation in constituency-level turnout. Next to that, we still account for the fact that certain parties might be more influential than others in mobilising the electorate as shown, for example, by Fisher et al. (2016 The latter is also by no means a stand-alone example. In fact, it illustrates a broader trend whereby the power of the traditional 'big three' is being eroded in more and more
Westminster constituencies. Therefore, our approach accounts for different combinations of parties in a constituency by setting apart the campaign efforts of (a)
'viable contenders' -those that have a realistic chance of winning the seat regardless of what party they represent -from (b) 'other contenders' who are not realistically in with a chance of winning the seat.
Empirically, this choice results in two parallel sets of models: the first set accounts for the combined campaign effort of all parties contesting the election in a constituency.
The second set then disentangles campaign effort on the basis of previous party performance in the constituency by focusing on the campaign effect associated with the parties of a particular standing in the given constituency. On the one hand, it is sensible to expect that the higher the aggregate campaign effort of all parties contesting the election in a constituency, the higher the turnout. On the other hand, past studies have proven the differential capacity across parties, leading us to expect that the positive effect of campaign effort on turnout is stronger for viable contenders than other contenders. While our specification of 'main' parties differs from previous studies by looking at the specific dynamics of party competition in each seat, there is no reason to expect invariance.
In addition to testing the above, we also explore the interplay between the campaign effort put in place in a constituency (aggregate as well as disaggregate) and electoral competitiveness of the constituency. Although previous studies have shown that both are useful predictors of turnout on their own, the extent to which the competitiveness of the race might moderate the positive effect of campaign effort remains unexplored.
As electorally relevant information serves the purpose of enhancing the visibility of the election, its positive effect on voters' likelihood of casting a ballot should be stronger in a constituency where the likelihood of this vote making a difference is higher. As such, we expect the effects of campaign effort to be conditioned by the marginality status of the race and we empirically test for the potential interaction effect between marginality and campaign effort.
Data and Measures
Parliamentary candidates in Britain are obliged by law to disclose their campaign The first core explanatory variable -marginality -is measured as the difference between the winner's and runner up's vote share at the previous election in percentage points.
3 It describes the expected competitiveness of the race in a given constituency.
4
As such, this difference effectively characterises the lead that the winner had in 2005
3 As a result of the Fifth Periodic Review of Westminster, the actual 2005 results could not be used to gauge the marginality of some constituencies. We rely on estimates of the 2005 results as if the election had been conducted under the new boundaries for those constituencies (Rallings and Thrasher 2007) . 4 For further discussion on the appropriateness of relying on the expectations about the closeness of the race to count for the expected vote see, for example, Bonneau (2007 We also include two control variables in the analysis. We explore the effect that the size of the electorate has on turnout, operationalised as the number of eligible voters in the district in thousands. As the size of the electorate increases, the probability that a single vote might influence the election outcome decreases. Therefore, following Downs' (1957) 'calculus-of-voting' model in which voters are instrumentally rational, we expect larger constituencies in terms of the electorate size to experience weaker turnout. Finally, we control for constituency type by setting apart those that are rural (county) from those that are urban (borough/burgh).
Empirical Strategy
Given that our dependent variable -turnout -is normally distributed, we implement OLS models with robust standard errors. Our analysis includes all 2010 Westminster constituencies in Britain 5 for which the Electoral Commission received full spending returns, with the exception of the Speaker's constituency as it is traditionally not contested by major parties. The final sample includes 615 constituencies. 5 The 17 constituencies in Northern Ireland are, therefore, excluded.
Findings and Discussion
We begin by looking at the effects of aggregate campaign spending (i.e., cumulative constituency-level campaign spending by all candidates who stood for election in the given constituency) on turnout in Model 1 (Table 1 below candidates in a constituency increases by the value of the legal spending limit in the particular constituency. 6 The negative and significant coefficient for marginality shows that turnout is higher when the seat is more competitive; i.e., the difference between the winner's and runner up's vote share was smaller in the previous election. Where the difference in vote share between first and second party was 10% lower in the 2005 election, turnout is 1% higher. We also find that turnout is lower where more people live in one-person households and the electorate is larger, while it is higher in constituencies where more of the working-age population is in the top social classes.
These empirical findings follow our theoretical expectations and are also in line with the indications provided by existing literature on turnout. In Model 2 we explore the extent to which campaign mobilisation effects vary across parties. We do so by distinguishing between the campaign efforts put in place by viable contenders in the constituency (based on the seat's marginality status) and other contenders. The disaggregated analysis indicates that there are several crucial differences in the extent to which more intense campaign efforts put in place by different parties stimulate electoral participation. The effects we observed in Model 1 are clearly driven first and foremost by the campaign efforts of viable contenders. The comparison of coefficients for viable and other contenders indicates that campaign spending by the former has over two times the effect on turnout than that of the latter.
In order to better illustrate this, Figure 1 shows the predicted turnout at all levels of cumulative campaign spending by viable contenders and other contenders. The clear difference in the steepness of the lines indicates that the effect sizes associated with campaign mobilisation efforts put in place by viable and other contenders do in fact vary notably. For example, predicted turnout rises by 3.6% when viable contenders' cumulative spending increases from no spending to three times the legal limit in the constituency, whereas only by 1.4% when a similar shift in the cumulative spending of other contenders takes place. of the party is, the stronger its ability to mobilise voters. This builds on the findings by Fisher et al. (2016) , but indicates also that a party's ability to bring voters to the polls is not necessarily determined by its national size and/or presence. Rather, its local status has a meaningful impact on its ability to mobilise voters.
Having explored the effects of campaign effort and marginality on turnout separately, we now move to assessing whether their effects are conditioned by one other. Table 2 below presents the result of the multiplicative models. Model 3 includes an interaction between the campaign spending of viable contenders in a constituency and marginality, while Model 4 presents an interaction between the spending of other contenders and marginality. We find that the effects of campaign effort are not conditioned by the competitiveness of the race. This is consistent across both models. Although the direction of the interaction is generally in line with our theoretical expectations, there is no substantial evidence of moderating effects.
The insignificant interaction terms suggest that higher levels of electoral information drive voters to the polls in constituencies where the race is open (between two or three viable competitors) as much as they do in safe constituencies (with only one viable candidate). While this goes against our initial expectations, it has an important realworld meaning: campaign efforts aimed at enhancing the visibility of the election contribute to electoral participation irrespective of electoral competitiveness.
Conclusions
In this study, we explored the impact of campaign intensity on turnout by looking at the aggregate constituency-level campaign effort to get out the vote by all parties. We did so under the premise that restricting the analysis to the traditional main parties in Britain -Labour, Conservatives, and Liberal Democrats -limits our understanding of how electioneering stimulates turnout. This is the first attempt to account for a rapidly changing political landscape in Britain, where several other parties are experiencing significant growth in membership and electoral support and, in turn, are choosing to deploy more and more campaign resources in their bids to win seats in the House of Commons. We find that greater campaign effort, providing higher amount of electoral information, does lead to greater electoral participation, ceteris paribus. The greater availability of information results in reduced costs of voting and, in turn, increases the likelihood of citizens casting a ballot.
Next to quantifying the impact of aggregate campaign effort, we also disaggregate its effects by party -setting them apart on the basis of whether or not they were 'viable contenders' in the constituency. Our approach allows for different combinations of parties to be treated as the 'viable' ones in a particular constituency, accounting for the increasingly varied dynamics of British politics on the local level. Our findings from the disaggregate analysis show that the effects of campaign effort on turnout are nearly three times stronger when carried out by parties that are viable contenders in the constituency than those who are not. This applies regardless of which exact parties count as 'viable' contenders in the constituency.
We then expand on how competitiveness of the race influences electoral participation.
While marginality has a discernible impact on turnout in line with our expectations, it does not condition the effectiveness of campaign effort (aggregate or disaggregate). In other words, no matter how competitive the race is expected to be in the constituency, making more electorally relevant information available to voters has a positive effect on turnout.
There are three key points arising from this study. Second, the lack of significant interaction effects between campaign effort on the one hand and marginality on the other hand suggests that providing information to voters is equally helpful in getting out the vote in safe and marginal constituencies. This has significant implications on how one should think about campaigning in these electoral contexts. Under the first-past-the-post system, the incentives to vote in safe seats are limited, particularly for those who do not support the incumbent party. This can, in turn, understandably be perceived by parties and candidates as a disincentive to spend resources in such constituencies. Our findings, however, indicate that even under such more unfavorable conditions for engaging with the electorate, parties unlikely to win should still campaign intensively as the information it communicates to voters does act as a trigger for greater electoral participation. 
